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hyperlane-monorepo/solidity/contracts/isms/multisig/AbstractMultisigIsm.sol

102 lines
3.7 KiB

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
pragma solidity >=0.8.0;
// ============ External Imports ============
import {ECDSA} from "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/cryptography/ECDSA.sol";
// ============ Internal Imports ============
import {IInterchainSecurityModule} from "../../interfaces/IInterchainSecurityModule.sol";
import {IMultisigIsm} from "../../interfaces/isms/IMultisigIsm.sol";
import {Message} from "../../libs/Message.sol";
import {MerkleLib} from "../../libs/Merkle.sol";
/**
* @title MultisigIsm
* @notice Manages per-domain m-of-n Validator sets that are used to verify
* interchain messages.
Make merkle proofs optional on multisig ISM (#2173) ### Description Validators currently sign `(root, index)` checkpoints and during verification, a `message` is passed as calldata, an `id()` is derived, and a `proof` of `id()` at `index` in `root` is verified This provides “all or nothing” censorship resistance guarantees because a validator can only sign roots to allow any contained messages to be processed. We have considered alternatives where validators sign `message` directly and we lose censorship resistance in exchange for eliminating merkle proof verification gas costs. However, if validators sign `(root, index, message)` tuples, we can skip merkle proof verification on the destination chain while still maintaining censorship resistance by providing two valid metadata formats: 1. existing validator signatures and merkle proof verification of inclusion 2. including merkle proof verification for pathway where validators are censoring `message` It’s worth noting the validator is required to index event data to produce this new signature format. However, this does not require historical indexing and new validators being spun up can simply begin indexing from tip. See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2187 for validator changes See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2248 for relayer and e2e test changes ### Drive-by changes Merkle index also optional ### Related issues - Fixes https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/issues/2192 ### Backward compatibility - new ISM deployment is necessary (we could upgrade implementation in theory) - Validator and relayer upgrades ### Testing Unit (fuzz) Tests, E2E tests
2 years ago
* @dev See ./AbstractMerkleRootMultisigIsm.sol and ./AbstractMessageIdMultisigIsm.sol
* for concrete implementations of `digest` and `signatureAt`.
* @dev See ./StaticMultisigIsm.sol for concrete implementations.
*/
abstract contract AbstractMultisigIsm is IMultisigIsm {
// ============ Virtual Functions ============
// ======= OVERRIDE THESE TO IMPLEMENT =======
/**
* @notice Returns the set of validators responsible for verifying _message
* and the number of signatures required
* @dev Can change based on the content of _message
* @param _message Hyperlane formatted interchain message
* @return validators The array of validator addresses
* @return threshold The number of validator signatures needed
*/
function validatorsAndThreshold(bytes calldata _message)
public
view
virtual
returns (address[] memory, uint8);
/**
Make merkle proofs optional on multisig ISM (#2173) ### Description Validators currently sign `(root, index)` checkpoints and during verification, a `message` is passed as calldata, an `id()` is derived, and a `proof` of `id()` at `index` in `root` is verified This provides “all or nothing” censorship resistance guarantees because a validator can only sign roots to allow any contained messages to be processed. We have considered alternatives where validators sign `message` directly and we lose censorship resistance in exchange for eliminating merkle proof verification gas costs. However, if validators sign `(root, index, message)` tuples, we can skip merkle proof verification on the destination chain while still maintaining censorship resistance by providing two valid metadata formats: 1. existing validator signatures and merkle proof verification of inclusion 2. including merkle proof verification for pathway where validators are censoring `message` It’s worth noting the validator is required to index event data to produce this new signature format. However, this does not require historical indexing and new validators being spun up can simply begin indexing from tip. See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2187 for validator changes See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2248 for relayer and e2e test changes ### Drive-by changes Merkle index also optional ### Related issues - Fixes https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/issues/2192 ### Backward compatibility - new ISM deployment is necessary (we could upgrade implementation in theory) - Validator and relayer upgrades ### Testing Unit (fuzz) Tests, E2E tests
2 years ago
* @notice Returns the digest to be used for signature verification.
* @param _metadata ABI encoded module metadata
* @param _message Formatted Hyperlane message (see Message.sol).
Make merkle proofs optional on multisig ISM (#2173) ### Description Validators currently sign `(root, index)` checkpoints and during verification, a `message` is passed as calldata, an `id()` is derived, and a `proof` of `id()` at `index` in `root` is verified This provides “all or nothing” censorship resistance guarantees because a validator can only sign roots to allow any contained messages to be processed. We have considered alternatives where validators sign `message` directly and we lose censorship resistance in exchange for eliminating merkle proof verification gas costs. However, if validators sign `(root, index, message)` tuples, we can skip merkle proof verification on the destination chain while still maintaining censorship resistance by providing two valid metadata formats: 1. existing validator signatures and merkle proof verification of inclusion 2. including merkle proof verification for pathway where validators are censoring `message` It’s worth noting the validator is required to index event data to produce this new signature format. However, this does not require historical indexing and new validators being spun up can simply begin indexing from tip. See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2187 for validator changes See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2248 for relayer and e2e test changes ### Drive-by changes Merkle index also optional ### Related issues - Fixes https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/issues/2192 ### Backward compatibility - new ISM deployment is necessary (we could upgrade implementation in theory) - Validator and relayer upgrades ### Testing Unit (fuzz) Tests, E2E tests
2 years ago
* @return digest The digest to be signed by validators
*/
Make merkle proofs optional on multisig ISM (#2173) ### Description Validators currently sign `(root, index)` checkpoints and during verification, a `message` is passed as calldata, an `id()` is derived, and a `proof` of `id()` at `index` in `root` is verified This provides “all or nothing” censorship resistance guarantees because a validator can only sign roots to allow any contained messages to be processed. We have considered alternatives where validators sign `message` directly and we lose censorship resistance in exchange for eliminating merkle proof verification gas costs. However, if validators sign `(root, index, message)` tuples, we can skip merkle proof verification on the destination chain while still maintaining censorship resistance by providing two valid metadata formats: 1. existing validator signatures and merkle proof verification of inclusion 2. including merkle proof verification for pathway where validators are censoring `message` It’s worth noting the validator is required to index event data to produce this new signature format. However, this does not require historical indexing and new validators being spun up can simply begin indexing from tip. See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2187 for validator changes See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2248 for relayer and e2e test changes ### Drive-by changes Merkle index also optional ### Related issues - Fixes https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/issues/2192 ### Backward compatibility - new ISM deployment is necessary (we could upgrade implementation in theory) - Validator and relayer upgrades ### Testing Unit (fuzz) Tests, E2E tests
2 years ago
function digest(bytes calldata _metadata, bytes calldata _message)
internal
view
Make merkle proofs optional on multisig ISM (#2173) ### Description Validators currently sign `(root, index)` checkpoints and during verification, a `message` is passed as calldata, an `id()` is derived, and a `proof` of `id()` at `index` in `root` is verified This provides “all or nothing” censorship resistance guarantees because a validator can only sign roots to allow any contained messages to be processed. We have considered alternatives where validators sign `message` directly and we lose censorship resistance in exchange for eliminating merkle proof verification gas costs. However, if validators sign `(root, index, message)` tuples, we can skip merkle proof verification on the destination chain while still maintaining censorship resistance by providing two valid metadata formats: 1. existing validator signatures and merkle proof verification of inclusion 2. including merkle proof verification for pathway where validators are censoring `message` It’s worth noting the validator is required to index event data to produce this new signature format. However, this does not require historical indexing and new validators being spun up can simply begin indexing from tip. See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2187 for validator changes See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2248 for relayer and e2e test changes ### Drive-by changes Merkle index also optional ### Related issues - Fixes https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/issues/2192 ### Backward compatibility - new ISM deployment is necessary (we could upgrade implementation in theory) - Validator and relayer upgrades ### Testing Unit (fuzz) Tests, E2E tests
2 years ago
virtual
returns (bytes32);
/**
Make merkle proofs optional on multisig ISM (#2173) ### Description Validators currently sign `(root, index)` checkpoints and during verification, a `message` is passed as calldata, an `id()` is derived, and a `proof` of `id()` at `index` in `root` is verified This provides “all or nothing” censorship resistance guarantees because a validator can only sign roots to allow any contained messages to be processed. We have considered alternatives where validators sign `message` directly and we lose censorship resistance in exchange for eliminating merkle proof verification gas costs. However, if validators sign `(root, index, message)` tuples, we can skip merkle proof verification on the destination chain while still maintaining censorship resistance by providing two valid metadata formats: 1. existing validator signatures and merkle proof verification of inclusion 2. including merkle proof verification for pathway where validators are censoring `message` It’s worth noting the validator is required to index event data to produce this new signature format. However, this does not require historical indexing and new validators being spun up can simply begin indexing from tip. See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2187 for validator changes See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2248 for relayer and e2e test changes ### Drive-by changes Merkle index also optional ### Related issues - Fixes https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/issues/2192 ### Backward compatibility - new ISM deployment is necessary (we could upgrade implementation in theory) - Validator and relayer upgrades ### Testing Unit (fuzz) Tests, E2E tests
2 years ago
* @notice Returns the signature at a given index from the metadata.
* @param _metadata ABI encoded module metadata
* @param _index The index of the signature to return
* @return signature Packed encoding of signature (65 bytes)
*/
Make merkle proofs optional on multisig ISM (#2173) ### Description Validators currently sign `(root, index)` checkpoints and during verification, a `message` is passed as calldata, an `id()` is derived, and a `proof` of `id()` at `index` in `root` is verified This provides “all or nothing” censorship resistance guarantees because a validator can only sign roots to allow any contained messages to be processed. We have considered alternatives where validators sign `message` directly and we lose censorship resistance in exchange for eliminating merkle proof verification gas costs. However, if validators sign `(root, index, message)` tuples, we can skip merkle proof verification on the destination chain while still maintaining censorship resistance by providing two valid metadata formats: 1. existing validator signatures and merkle proof verification of inclusion 2. including merkle proof verification for pathway where validators are censoring `message` It’s worth noting the validator is required to index event data to produce this new signature format. However, this does not require historical indexing and new validators being spun up can simply begin indexing from tip. See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2187 for validator changes See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2248 for relayer and e2e test changes ### Drive-by changes Merkle index also optional ### Related issues - Fixes https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/issues/2192 ### Backward compatibility - new ISM deployment is necessary (we could upgrade implementation in theory) - Validator and relayer upgrades ### Testing Unit (fuzz) Tests, E2E tests
2 years ago
function signatureAt(bytes calldata _metadata, uint256 _index)
internal
pure
virtual
returns (bytes calldata);
Make merkle proofs optional on multisig ISM (#2173) ### Description Validators currently sign `(root, index)` checkpoints and during verification, a `message` is passed as calldata, an `id()` is derived, and a `proof` of `id()` at `index` in `root` is verified This provides “all or nothing” censorship resistance guarantees because a validator can only sign roots to allow any contained messages to be processed. We have considered alternatives where validators sign `message` directly and we lose censorship resistance in exchange for eliminating merkle proof verification gas costs. However, if validators sign `(root, index, message)` tuples, we can skip merkle proof verification on the destination chain while still maintaining censorship resistance by providing two valid metadata formats: 1. existing validator signatures and merkle proof verification of inclusion 2. including merkle proof verification for pathway where validators are censoring `message` It’s worth noting the validator is required to index event data to produce this new signature format. However, this does not require historical indexing and new validators being spun up can simply begin indexing from tip. See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2187 for validator changes See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2248 for relayer and e2e test changes ### Drive-by changes Merkle index also optional ### Related issues - Fixes https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/issues/2192 ### Backward compatibility - new ISM deployment is necessary (we could upgrade implementation in theory) - Validator and relayer upgrades ### Testing Unit (fuzz) Tests, E2E tests
2 years ago
// ============ Public Functions ============
/**
Make merkle proofs optional on multisig ISM (#2173) ### Description Validators currently sign `(root, index)` checkpoints and during verification, a `message` is passed as calldata, an `id()` is derived, and a `proof` of `id()` at `index` in `root` is verified This provides “all or nothing” censorship resistance guarantees because a validator can only sign roots to allow any contained messages to be processed. We have considered alternatives where validators sign `message` directly and we lose censorship resistance in exchange for eliminating merkle proof verification gas costs. However, if validators sign `(root, index, message)` tuples, we can skip merkle proof verification on the destination chain while still maintaining censorship resistance by providing two valid metadata formats: 1. existing validator signatures and merkle proof verification of inclusion 2. including merkle proof verification for pathway where validators are censoring `message` It’s worth noting the validator is required to index event data to produce this new signature format. However, this does not require historical indexing and new validators being spun up can simply begin indexing from tip. See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2187 for validator changes See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2248 for relayer and e2e test changes ### Drive-by changes Merkle index also optional ### Related issues - Fixes https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/issues/2192 ### Backward compatibility - new ISM deployment is necessary (we could upgrade implementation in theory) - Validator and relayer upgrades ### Testing Unit (fuzz) Tests, E2E tests
2 years ago
* @notice Requires that m-of-n validators verify a merkle root,
* and verifies a merkle proof of `_message` against that root.
* @param _metadata ABI encoded module metadata
* @param _message Formatted Hyperlane message (see Message.sol).
*/
Make merkle proofs optional on multisig ISM (#2173) ### Description Validators currently sign `(root, index)` checkpoints and during verification, a `message` is passed as calldata, an `id()` is derived, and a `proof` of `id()` at `index` in `root` is verified This provides “all or nothing” censorship resistance guarantees because a validator can only sign roots to allow any contained messages to be processed. We have considered alternatives where validators sign `message` directly and we lose censorship resistance in exchange for eliminating merkle proof verification gas costs. However, if validators sign `(root, index, message)` tuples, we can skip merkle proof verification on the destination chain while still maintaining censorship resistance by providing two valid metadata formats: 1. existing validator signatures and merkle proof verification of inclusion 2. including merkle proof verification for pathway where validators are censoring `message` It’s worth noting the validator is required to index event data to produce this new signature format. However, this does not require historical indexing and new validators being spun up can simply begin indexing from tip. See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2187 for validator changes See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2248 for relayer and e2e test changes ### Drive-by changes Merkle index also optional ### Related issues - Fixes https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/issues/2192 ### Backward compatibility - new ISM deployment is necessary (we could upgrade implementation in theory) - Validator and relayer upgrades ### Testing Unit (fuzz) Tests, E2E tests
2 years ago
function verify(bytes calldata _metadata, bytes calldata _message)
public
view
returns (bool)
{
bytes32 _digest = digest(_metadata, _message);
(
address[] memory _validators,
uint8 _threshold
) = validatorsAndThreshold(_message);
require(_threshold > 0, "No MultisigISM threshold present for message");
Make merkle proofs optional on multisig ISM (#2173) ### Description Validators currently sign `(root, index)` checkpoints and during verification, a `message` is passed as calldata, an `id()` is derived, and a `proof` of `id()` at `index` in `root` is verified This provides “all or nothing” censorship resistance guarantees because a validator can only sign roots to allow any contained messages to be processed. We have considered alternatives where validators sign `message` directly and we lose censorship resistance in exchange for eliminating merkle proof verification gas costs. However, if validators sign `(root, index, message)` tuples, we can skip merkle proof verification on the destination chain while still maintaining censorship resistance by providing two valid metadata formats: 1. existing validator signatures and merkle proof verification of inclusion 2. including merkle proof verification for pathway where validators are censoring `message` It’s worth noting the validator is required to index event data to produce this new signature format. However, this does not require historical indexing and new validators being spun up can simply begin indexing from tip. See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2187 for validator changes See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2248 for relayer and e2e test changes ### Drive-by changes Merkle index also optional ### Related issues - Fixes https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/issues/2192 ### Backward compatibility - new ISM deployment is necessary (we could upgrade implementation in theory) - Validator and relayer upgrades ### Testing Unit (fuzz) Tests, E2E tests
2 years ago
uint256 _validatorCount = _validators.length;
uint256 _validatorIndex = 0;
// Assumes that signatures are ordered by validator
for (uint256 i = 0; i < _threshold; ++i) {
Make merkle proofs optional on multisig ISM (#2173) ### Description Validators currently sign `(root, index)` checkpoints and during verification, a `message` is passed as calldata, an `id()` is derived, and a `proof` of `id()` at `index` in `root` is verified This provides “all or nothing” censorship resistance guarantees because a validator can only sign roots to allow any contained messages to be processed. We have considered alternatives where validators sign `message` directly and we lose censorship resistance in exchange for eliminating merkle proof verification gas costs. However, if validators sign `(root, index, message)` tuples, we can skip merkle proof verification on the destination chain while still maintaining censorship resistance by providing two valid metadata formats: 1. existing validator signatures and merkle proof verification of inclusion 2. including merkle proof verification for pathway where validators are censoring `message` It’s worth noting the validator is required to index event data to produce this new signature format. However, this does not require historical indexing and new validators being spun up can simply begin indexing from tip. See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2187 for validator changes See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2248 for relayer and e2e test changes ### Drive-by changes Merkle index also optional ### Related issues - Fixes https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/issues/2192 ### Backward compatibility - new ISM deployment is necessary (we could upgrade implementation in theory) - Validator and relayer upgrades ### Testing Unit (fuzz) Tests, E2E tests
2 years ago
address _signer = ECDSA.recover(_digest, signatureAt(_metadata, i));
// Loop through remaining validators until we find a match
while (
_validatorIndex < _validatorCount &&
_signer != _validators[_validatorIndex]
) {
++_validatorIndex;
}
// Fail if we never found a match
require(_validatorIndex < _validatorCount, "!threshold");
++_validatorIndex;
}
return true;
}
}