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hyperlane-monorepo/solidity/contracts/libs/Merkle.sol

209 lines
8.0 KiB

// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0
pragma solidity >=0.6.11;
// work based on eth2 deposit contract, which is used under CC0-1.0
/**
* @title MerkleLib
* @author Celo Labs Inc.
* @notice An incremental merkle tree modeled on the eth2 deposit contract.
**/
library MerkleLib {
uint256 internal constant TREE_DEPTH = 32;
uint256 internal constant MAX_LEAVES = 2 ** TREE_DEPTH - 1;
/**
* @notice Struct representing incremental merkle tree. Contains current
* branch and the number of inserted leaves in the tree.
**/
struct Tree {
bytes32[TREE_DEPTH] branch;
uint256 count;
}
/**
* @notice Inserts `_node` into merkle tree
* @dev Reverts if tree is full
* @param _node Element to insert into tree
**/
function insert(Tree storage _tree, bytes32 _node) internal {
require(_tree.count < MAX_LEAVES, "merkle tree full");
_tree.count += 1;
uint256 size = _tree.count;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < TREE_DEPTH; i++) {
if ((size & 1) == 1) {
_tree.branch[i] = _node;
return;
}
_node = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(_tree.branch[i], _node));
size /= 2;
}
// As the loop should always end prematurely with the `return` statement,
// this code should be unreachable. We assert `false` just to be safe.
assert(false);
}
/**
* @notice Calculates and returns`_tree`'s current root given array of zero
* hashes
* @param _zeroes Array of zero hashes
* @return _current Calculated root of `_tree`
**/
function rootWithCtx(
Tree storage _tree,
bytes32[TREE_DEPTH] memory _zeroes
) internal view returns (bytes32 _current) {
uint256 _index = _tree.count;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < TREE_DEPTH; i++) {
uint256 _ithBit = (_index >> i) & 0x01;
bytes32 _next = _tree.branch[i];
if (_ithBit == 1) {
_current = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(_next, _current));
} else {
_current = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(_current, _zeroes[i]));
}
}
}
/// @notice Calculates and returns`_tree`'s current root
function root(Tree storage _tree) internal view returns (bytes32) {
return rootWithCtx(_tree, zeroHashes());
}
/// @notice Returns array of TREE_DEPTH zero hashes
/// @return _zeroes Array of TREE_DEPTH zero hashes
function zeroHashes()
internal
pure
returns (bytes32[TREE_DEPTH] memory _zeroes)
{
_zeroes[0] = Z_0;
_zeroes[1] = Z_1;
_zeroes[2] = Z_2;
_zeroes[3] = Z_3;
_zeroes[4] = Z_4;
_zeroes[5] = Z_5;
_zeroes[6] = Z_6;
_zeroes[7] = Z_7;
_zeroes[8] = Z_8;
_zeroes[9] = Z_9;
_zeroes[10] = Z_10;
_zeroes[11] = Z_11;
_zeroes[12] = Z_12;
_zeroes[13] = Z_13;
_zeroes[14] = Z_14;
_zeroes[15] = Z_15;
_zeroes[16] = Z_16;
_zeroes[17] = Z_17;
_zeroes[18] = Z_18;
_zeroes[19] = Z_19;
_zeroes[20] = Z_20;
_zeroes[21] = Z_21;
_zeroes[22] = Z_22;
_zeroes[23] = Z_23;
_zeroes[24] = Z_24;
_zeroes[25] = Z_25;
_zeroes[26] = Z_26;
_zeroes[27] = Z_27;
_zeroes[28] = Z_28;
_zeroes[29] = Z_29;
_zeroes[30] = Z_30;
_zeroes[31] = Z_31;
}
/**
* @notice Calculates and returns the merkle root for the given leaf
* `_item`, a merkle branch, and the index of `_item` in the tree.
* @param _item Merkle leaf
* @param _branch Merkle proof
* @param _index Index of `_item` in tree
* @return _current Calculated merkle root
**/
function branchRoot(
bytes32 _item,
Make merkle proofs optional on multisig ISM (#2173) ### Description Validators currently sign `(root, index)` checkpoints and during verification, a `message` is passed as calldata, an `id()` is derived, and a `proof` of `id()` at `index` in `root` is verified This provides “all or nothing” censorship resistance guarantees because a validator can only sign roots to allow any contained messages to be processed. We have considered alternatives where validators sign `message` directly and we lose censorship resistance in exchange for eliminating merkle proof verification gas costs. However, if validators sign `(root, index, message)` tuples, we can skip merkle proof verification on the destination chain while still maintaining censorship resistance by providing two valid metadata formats: 1. existing validator signatures and merkle proof verification of inclusion 2. including merkle proof verification for pathway where validators are censoring `message` It’s worth noting the validator is required to index event data to produce this new signature format. However, this does not require historical indexing and new validators being spun up can simply begin indexing from tip. See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2187 for validator changes See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2248 for relayer and e2e test changes ### Drive-by changes Merkle index also optional ### Related issues - Fixes https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/issues/2192 ### Backward compatibility - new ISM deployment is necessary (we could upgrade implementation in theory) - Validator and relayer upgrades ### Testing Unit (fuzz) Tests, E2E tests
2 years ago
bytes32[TREE_DEPTH] memory _branch, // cheaper than calldata indexing
uint256 _index
) internal pure returns (bytes32 _current) {
_current = _item;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < TREE_DEPTH; i++) {
uint256 _ithBit = (_index >> i) & 0x01;
Make merkle proofs optional on multisig ISM (#2173) ### Description Validators currently sign `(root, index)` checkpoints and during verification, a `message` is passed as calldata, an `id()` is derived, and a `proof` of `id()` at `index` in `root` is verified This provides “all or nothing” censorship resistance guarantees because a validator can only sign roots to allow any contained messages to be processed. We have considered alternatives where validators sign `message` directly and we lose censorship resistance in exchange for eliminating merkle proof verification gas costs. However, if validators sign `(root, index, message)` tuples, we can skip merkle proof verification on the destination chain while still maintaining censorship resistance by providing two valid metadata formats: 1. existing validator signatures and merkle proof verification of inclusion 2. including merkle proof verification for pathway where validators are censoring `message` It’s worth noting the validator is required to index event data to produce this new signature format. However, this does not require historical indexing and new validators being spun up can simply begin indexing from tip. See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2187 for validator changes See https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/pull/2248 for relayer and e2e test changes ### Drive-by changes Merkle index also optional ### Related issues - Fixes https://github.com/hyperlane-xyz/hyperlane-monorepo/issues/2192 ### Backward compatibility - new ISM deployment is necessary (we could upgrade implementation in theory) - Validator and relayer upgrades ### Testing Unit (fuzz) Tests, E2E tests
2 years ago
// cheaper than calldata indexing _branch[i*32:(i+1)*32];
bytes32 _next = _branch[i];
if (_ithBit == 1) {
_current = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(_next, _current));
} else {
_current = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(_current, _next));
}
}
}
// keccak256 zero hashes
bytes32 internal constant Z_0 =
hex"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
bytes32 internal constant Z_1 =
hex"ad3228b676f7d3cd4284a5443f17f1962b36e491b30a40b2405849e597ba5fb5";
bytes32 internal constant Z_2 =
hex"b4c11951957c6f8f642c4af61cd6b24640fec6dc7fc607ee8206a99e92410d30";
bytes32 internal constant Z_3 =
hex"21ddb9a356815c3fac1026b6dec5df3124afbadb485c9ba5a3e3398a04b7ba85";
bytes32 internal constant Z_4 =
hex"e58769b32a1beaf1ea27375a44095a0d1fb664ce2dd358e7fcbfb78c26a19344";
bytes32 internal constant Z_5 =
hex"0eb01ebfc9ed27500cd4dfc979272d1f0913cc9f66540d7e8005811109e1cf2d";
bytes32 internal constant Z_6 =
hex"887c22bd8750d34016ac3c66b5ff102dacdd73f6b014e710b51e8022af9a1968";
bytes32 internal constant Z_7 =
hex"ffd70157e48063fc33c97a050f7f640233bf646cc98d9524c6b92bcf3ab56f83";
bytes32 internal constant Z_8 =
hex"9867cc5f7f196b93bae1e27e6320742445d290f2263827498b54fec539f756af";
bytes32 internal constant Z_9 =
hex"cefad4e508c098b9a7e1d8feb19955fb02ba9675585078710969d3440f5054e0";
bytes32 internal constant Z_10 =
hex"f9dc3e7fe016e050eff260334f18a5d4fe391d82092319f5964f2e2eb7c1c3a5";
bytes32 internal constant Z_11 =
hex"f8b13a49e282f609c317a833fb8d976d11517c571d1221a265d25af778ecf892";
bytes32 internal constant Z_12 =
hex"3490c6ceeb450aecdc82e28293031d10c7d73bf85e57bf041a97360aa2c5d99c";
bytes32 internal constant Z_13 =
hex"c1df82d9c4b87413eae2ef048f94b4d3554cea73d92b0f7af96e0271c691e2bb";
bytes32 internal constant Z_14 =
hex"5c67add7c6caf302256adedf7ab114da0acfe870d449a3a489f781d659e8becc";
bytes32 internal constant Z_15 =
hex"da7bce9f4e8618b6bd2f4132ce798cdc7a60e7e1460a7299e3c6342a579626d2";
bytes32 internal constant Z_16 =
hex"2733e50f526ec2fa19a22b31e8ed50f23cd1fdf94c9154ed3a7609a2f1ff981f";
bytes32 internal constant Z_17 =
hex"e1d3b5c807b281e4683cc6d6315cf95b9ade8641defcb32372f1c126e398ef7a";
bytes32 internal constant Z_18 =
hex"5a2dce0a8a7f68bb74560f8f71837c2c2ebbcbf7fffb42ae1896f13f7c7479a0";
bytes32 internal constant Z_19 =
hex"b46a28b6f55540f89444f63de0378e3d121be09e06cc9ded1c20e65876d36aa0";
bytes32 internal constant Z_20 =
hex"c65e9645644786b620e2dd2ad648ddfcbf4a7e5b1a3a4ecfe7f64667a3f0b7e2";
bytes32 internal constant Z_21 =
hex"f4418588ed35a2458cffeb39b93d26f18d2ab13bdce6aee58e7b99359ec2dfd9";
bytes32 internal constant Z_22 =
hex"5a9c16dc00d6ef18b7933a6f8dc65ccb55667138776f7dea101070dc8796e377";
bytes32 internal constant Z_23 =
hex"4df84f40ae0c8229d0d6069e5c8f39a7c299677a09d367fc7b05e3bc380ee652";
bytes32 internal constant Z_24 =
hex"cdc72595f74c7b1043d0e1ffbab734648c838dfb0527d971b602bc216c9619ef";
bytes32 internal constant Z_25 =
hex"0abf5ac974a1ed57f4050aa510dd9c74f508277b39d7973bb2dfccc5eeb0618d";
bytes32 internal constant Z_26 =
hex"b8cd74046ff337f0a7bf2c8e03e10f642c1886798d71806ab1e888d9e5ee87d0";
bytes32 internal constant Z_27 =
hex"838c5655cb21c6cb83313b5a631175dff4963772cce9108188b34ac87c81c41e";
bytes32 internal constant Z_28 =
hex"662ee4dd2dd7b2bc707961b1e646c4047669dcb6584f0d8d770daf5d7e7deb2e";
bytes32 internal constant Z_29 =
hex"388ab20e2573d171a88108e79d820e98f26c0b84aa8b2f4aa4968dbb818ea322";
bytes32 internal constant Z_30 =
hex"93237c50ba75ee485f4c22adf2f741400bdf8d6a9cc7df7ecae576221665d735";
bytes32 internal constant Z_31 =
hex"8448818bb4ae4562849e949e17ac16e0be16688e156b5cf15e098c627c0056a9";
}