Security analysis tool for EVM bytecode. Supports smart contracts built for Ethereum, Hedera, Quorum, Vechain, Roostock, Tron and other EVM-compatible blockchains.
|Unprotected functions| Critical functions such as sends with non-zero value or suicide() calls are callable by anyone, or msg.sender is compared against an address in storage that can be written to. E.g. Parity wallet bugs. | [unchecked_suicide](mythril/analysis/modules/suicide.py), [ether_send](mythril/analysis/modules/ether_send.py) | |
|Re-entrancy| Genreally, contract state should never be relied on if untrusted contracts are called. State changes after external calls should be avoided. | [external calls to untrusted contracts](mythril/analysis/modules/external_calls.py) | [Call external functions last](https://consensys.github.io/smart-contract-best-practices/known_attacks/#reentrancy) [Avoid state changes after external calls](https://consensys.github.io/smart-contract-best-practices/recommendations/#avoid-state-changes-after-external-calls)|
|Multiple sends in a single transaction| External calls can fail accidentally or deliberately. Avoid combining multiple send() calls in a single transaction. | | [Favor pull over push for external calls](https://consensys.github.io/smart-contract-best-practices/recommendations/#favor-pull-over-push-for-external-calls) |
|Complex fallback function (uses more than 2,300 gas) | A too complex fallback function will cause send() and transfer() from other contracts to fail. To implement this we first need to fully implement gas simulation. | |
|Use require() instead of assert() | Use `assert()` only to check against states which should be completely unreachable. | [Exceptions](mythril/analysis/modules/exceptions.py) | [Solidity docs](https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/develop/control-structures.html#error-handling-assert-require-revert-and-exceptions)|