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/*
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Package crypto implements the collective signing (CoSi) algorithm as presented in
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the paper "Keeping Authorities 'Honest or Bust' with Decentralized Witness
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Cosigning" by Ewa Syta et al. See https://arxiv.org/abs/1503.08768. This
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package only provides the functionality for the cryptographic operations of
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CoSi. All network-related operations have to be handled elsewhere. Below we
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describe a high-level overview of the CoSi protocol (using a star communication
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topology). We refer to the research paper for further details on communication
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over trees, exception mechanisms and signature verification policies.
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The CoSi protocol has four phases executed between a list of participants P
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having a protocol leader (index i = 0) and a list of other nodes (index i > 0).
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The secret key of node i is denoted by a_i and the public key by A_i = [a_i]G
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(where G is the base point of the underlying group and [...] denotes scalar
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multiplication). The aggregate public key is given as A = \sum{i ∈ P}(A_i).
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1. Announcement: The leader broadcasts an announcement to the other nodes
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optionally including the message M to be signed. Upon receiving an announcement
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message, a node starts its commitment phase.
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2. Commitment: Each node i (including the leader) picks a random scalar v_i,
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computes its commitment V_i = [v_i]G and sends V_i back to the leader. The
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leader waits until it has received enough commitments (according to some
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policy) from the other nodes or a timer has run out. Let P' be the nodes that
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have sent their commitments. The leader computes an aggregate commitment V from
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all commitments he has received, i.e., V = \sum{j ∈ P'}(V_j) and creates a
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participation bitmask Z. The leader then broadcasts V and Z to the other
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participations together with the message M if it was not sent in phase 1. Upon
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receiving a commitment message, a node starts the challenge phase.
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3. Challenge: Each node i computes the collective challenge c = H(V || A || M)
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using a cryptographic hash function H (here: SHA512), computes its
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response r_i = v_i + c*a_i and sends it back to the leader.
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4. Response: The leader waits until he has received replies from all nodes in
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P' or a timer has run out. If he has not enough replies he aborts. Finally,
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the leader computes the aggregate response r = \sum{j ∈ P'}(r_j) and publishes
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(V,r,Z) as the signature for the message M.
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*/
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package crypto
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import (
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"github.com/dedis/kyber"
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)
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// Commit returns a random scalar v, generated from the given suite,
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// and a corresponding commitment V = [v]G. If the given cipher stream is nil,
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// a random stream is used.
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func Commit(suite Suite) (v kyber.Scalar, V kyber.Point) {
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random := suite.Scalar().Pick(suite.RandomStream())
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commitment := suite.Point().Mul(random, nil)
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return random, commitment
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}
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// AggregateCommitments returns the sum of the given commitments and the
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// bitwise OR of the corresponding masks.
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func AggregateCommitments(suite Suite, commitments []kyber.Point, masks [][]byte) (sum kyber.Point, commits []byte, err error) {
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if len(commitments) != len(masks) {
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return nil, nil, errors.New("mismatching lengths of commitment and mask slices")
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}
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aggCom := suite.Point().Null()
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aggMask := make([]byte, len(masks[0]))
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for i := range commitments {
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aggCom = suite.Point().Add(aggCom, commitments[i])
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aggMask, err = AggregateMasks(aggMask, masks[i])
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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}
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return aggCom, aggMask, nil
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}
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// AggregateCommitmentsOnly returns the sum of the given commitments.
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func AggregateCommitmentsOnly(suite Suite, commitments []kyber.Point) kyber.Point {
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aggCom := suite.Point().Null()
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for i := range commitments {
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aggCom = suite.Point().Add(aggCom, commitments[i])
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}
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return aggCom
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}
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// Challenge creates the collective challenge from the given aggregate
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// commitment V, aggregate public key A, and message M, i.e., it returns
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// c = H(V || A || M).
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func Challenge(suite Suite, commitment, public kyber.Point, message []byte) (kyber.Scalar, error) {
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if commitment == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("no commitment provided")
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}
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if message == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("no message provided")
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}
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hash := suite.Hash()
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if _, err := commitment.MarshalTo(hash); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if _, err := public.MarshalTo(hash); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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hash.Write(message)
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return suite.Scalar().SetBytes(hash.Sum(nil)), nil
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}
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// Response creates the response from the given random scalar v, (collective)
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// challenge c, and private key a, i.e., it returns r = v + c*a.
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func Response(suite Suite, private, random, challenge kyber.Scalar) (kyber.Scalar, error) {
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if private == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("no private key provided")
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}
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if random == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("no random scalar provided")
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}
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if challenge == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("no challenge provided")
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}
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// TODO: figure out why in the paper it says r = v - cx
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ca := suite.Scalar().Mul(private, challenge)
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return ca.Add(random, ca), nil
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}
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// AggregateResponses returns the sum of given responses.
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func AggregateResponses(suite Suite, responses []kyber.Scalar) (kyber.Scalar, error) {
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if responses == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("no responses provided")
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}
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r := suite.Scalar().Zero()
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for i := range responses {
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r = r.Add(r, responses[i])
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}
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return r, nil
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}
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// Sign returns the collective signature from the given (aggregate) commitment
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// V, (aggregate) response r, and participation bitmask Z using the EdDSA
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// format, i.e., the signature is V || r || Z.
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func Sign(suite Suite, commitment kyber.Point, response kyber.Scalar, mask *Mask) ([]byte, error) {
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if commitment == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("no commitment provided")
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}
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if response == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("no response provided")
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}
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if mask == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("no mask provided")
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}
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lenV := suite.PointLen()
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lenSig := lenV + suite.ScalarLen()
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VB, err := commitment.MarshalBinary()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, errors.New("marshalling of commitment failed")
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}
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RB, err := response.MarshalBinary()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, errors.New("marshalling of signature failed")
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}
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sig := make([]byte, lenSig+mask.Len())
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copy(sig[:], VB)
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copy(sig[lenV:lenSig], RB)
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copy(sig[lenSig:], mask.mask)
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return sig, nil
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}
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// Verify checks the given cosignature on the provided message using the list
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// of public keys and cosigning policy.
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func Verify(suite Suite, publics []kyber.Point, message, sig []byte, policy Policy) error {
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if publics == nil {
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return errors.New("no public keys provided")
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}
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if message == nil {
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return errors.New("no message provided")
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}
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if sig == nil {
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return errors.New("no signature provided")
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}
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if policy == nil {
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policy = CompletePolicy{}
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}
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lenCom := suite.PointLen()
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VBuff := sig[:lenCom]
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V := suite.Point()
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if err := V.UnmarshalBinary(VBuff); err != nil {
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return errors.New("unmarshalling of commitment failed")
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}
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// Unpack the aggregate response
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lenRes := lenCom + suite.ScalarLen()
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rBuff := sig[lenCom:lenRes]
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r := suite.Scalar().SetBytes(rBuff)
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// Unpack the participation mask and get the aggregate public key
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mask, err := NewMask(suite, publics, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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mask.SetMask(sig[lenRes:])
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A := mask.AggregatePublic
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ABuff, err := A.MarshalBinary()
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if err != nil {
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return errors.New("marshalling of aggregate public key failed")
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}
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// Recompute the challenge
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hash := suite.Hash()
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hash.Write(VBuff)
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hash.Write(ABuff)
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hash.Write(message)
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buff := hash.Sum(nil)
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k := suite.Scalar().SetBytes(buff)
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// k * -aggPublic + s * B = k*-A + s*B
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// from s = k * a + r => s * B = k * a * B + r * B <=> s*B = k*A + r*B
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// <=> s*B + k*-A = r*B
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minusPublic := suite.Point().Neg(A)
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kA := suite.Point().Mul(k, minusPublic)
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sB := suite.Point().Mul(r, nil)
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left := suite.Point().Add(kA, sB)
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if !left.Equal(V) {
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return errors.New("recreated response is different from signature")
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}
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if !policy.Check(mask) {
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return errors.New("the policy is not fulfilled")
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Mask represents a cosigning participation bitmask.
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type Mask struct {
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mask []byte
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publics []kyber.Point
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AggregatePublic kyber.Point
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}
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// NewMask returns a new participation bitmask for cosigning where all
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// cosigners are disabled by default. If a public key is given it verifies that
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// it is present in the list of keys and sets the corresponding index in the
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// bitmask to 1 (enabled).
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func NewMask(suite Suite, publics []kyber.Point, myKey kyber.Point) (*Mask, error) {
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m := &Mask{
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publics: publics,
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}
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m.mask = make([]byte, m.Len())
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m.AggregatePublic = suite.Point().Null()
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if myKey != nil {
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found := false
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for i, key := range publics {
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if key.Equal(myKey) {
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m.SetBit(i, true)
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found = true
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break
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}
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}
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if !found {
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return nil, errors.New("key not found")
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}
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}
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return m, nil
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}
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// Mask returns a copy of the participation bitmask.
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func (m *Mask) Mask() []byte {
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clone := make([]byte, len(m.mask))
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copy(clone[:], m.mask)
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return clone
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}
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// Len returns the mask length in bytes.
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func (m *Mask) Len() int {
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return (len(m.publics) + 7) >> 3
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}
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// SetMask sets the participation bitmask according to the given byte slice
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// interpreted in little-endian order, i.e., bits 0-7 of byte 0 correspond to
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// cosigners 0-7, bits 0-7 of byte 1 correspond to cosigners 8-15, etc.
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func (m *Mask) SetMask(mask []byte) error {
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if m.Len() != len(mask) {
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return fmt.Errorf("mismatching mask lengths")
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}
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for i := range m.publics {
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byt := i >> 3
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msk := byte(1) << uint(i&7)
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if ((m.mask[byt] & msk) == 0) && ((mask[byt] & msk) != 0) {
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m.mask[byt] ^= msk // flip bit in mask from 0 to 1
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m.AggregatePublic.Add(m.AggregatePublic, m.publics[i])
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}
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if ((m.mask[byt] & msk) != 0) && ((mask[byt] & msk) == 0) {
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m.mask[byt] ^= msk // flip bit in mask from 1 to 0
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m.AggregatePublic.Sub(m.AggregatePublic, m.publics[i])
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// SetBit enables (enable: true) or disables (enable: false) the bit
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// in the participation mask of the given cosigner.
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func (m *Mask) SetBit(i int, enable bool) error {
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if i >= len(m.publics) {
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return errors.New("index out of range")
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}
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byt := i >> 3
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msk := byte(1) << uint(i&7)
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if ((m.mask[byt] & msk) == 0) && enable {
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m.mask[byt] ^= msk // flip bit in mask from 0 to 1
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m.AggregatePublic.Add(m.AggregatePublic, m.publics[i])
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}
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if ((m.mask[byt] & msk) != 0) && !enable {
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m.mask[byt] ^= msk // flip bit in mask from 1 to 0
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m.AggregatePublic.Sub(m.AggregatePublic, m.publics[i])
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}
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return nil
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}
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// GetPubKeyFromMask will return pubkeys which masked either zero or one depending on the flag
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// it is used to show which signers are signed or not in the cosign message
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func (m *Mask) GetPubKeyFromMask(flag bool) []kyber.Point {
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pubKeys := []kyber.Point{}
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for i := range m.publics {
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byt := i >> 3
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msk := byte(1) << uint(i&7)
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if flag == true {
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if (m.mask[byt] & msk) != 0 {
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pubKeys = append(pubKeys, m.publics[i])
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}
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} else {
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if (m.mask[byt] & msk) == 0 {
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pubKeys = append(pubKeys, m.publics[i])
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}
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}
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}
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return pubKeys
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}
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// IndexEnabled checks whether the given index is enabled in the mask or not.
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func (m *Mask) IndexEnabled(i int) (bool, error) {
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if i >= len(m.publics) {
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return false, errors.New("index out of range")
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}
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byt := i >> 3
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msk := byte(1) << uint(i&7)
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return ((m.mask[byt] & msk) != 0), nil
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}
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// KeyEnabled checks whether the index, corresponding to the given key, is
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// enabled in the mask or not.
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|
|
func (m *Mask) KeyEnabled(public kyber.Point) (bool, error) {
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for i, key := range m.publics {
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|
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if key.Equal(public) {
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return m.IndexEnabled(i)
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}
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}
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|
|
return false, errors.New("key not found")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// SetKey set the bit in the mask for the given cosigner
|
|
|
|
func (m *Mask) SetKey(public kyber.Point, enable bool) error {
|
|
|
|
for i, key := range m.publics {
|
|
|
|
if key.Equal(public) {
|
|
|
|
return m.SetBit(i, enable)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return errors.New("key not found")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// CountEnabled returns the number of enabled nodes in the CoSi participation
|
|
|
|
// mask.
|
|
|
|
func (m *Mask) CountEnabled() int {
|
|
|
|
// hw is hamming weight
|
|
|
|
hw := 0
|
|
|
|
for i := range m.publics {
|
|
|
|
byt := i >> 3
|
|
|
|
msk := byte(1) << uint(i&7)
|
|
|
|
if (m.mask[byt] & msk) != 0 {
|
|
|
|
hw++
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return hw
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// CountTotal returns the total number of nodes this CoSi instance knows.
|
|
|
|
func (m *Mask) CountTotal() int {
|
|
|
|
return len(m.publics)
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// AggregateMasks computes the bitwise OR of the two given participation masks.
|
|
|
|
func AggregateMasks(a, b []byte) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
|
|
if len(a) != len(b) {
|
|
|
|
return nil, errors.New("mismatching mask lengths")
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
m := make([]byte, len(a))
|
|
|
|
for i := range m {
|
|
|
|
m[i] = a[i] | b[i]
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return m, nil
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Policy represents a fully customizable cosigning policy deciding what
|
|
|
|
// cosigner sets are and aren't sufficient for a collective signature to be
|
|
|
|
// considered acceptable to a verifier. The Check method may inspect the set of
|
|
|
|
// participants that cosigned by invoking cosi.Mask and/or cosi.MaskBit, and may
|
|
|
|
// use any other relevant contextual information (e.g., how security-critical
|
|
|
|
// the operation relying on the collective signature is) in determining whether
|
|
|
|
// the collective signature was produced by an acceptable set of cosigners.
|
|
|
|
type Policy interface {
|
|
|
|
Check(m *Mask) bool
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// CompletePolicy is the default policy requiring that all participants have
|
|
|
|
// cosigned to make a collective signature valid.
|
|
|
|
type CompletePolicy struct {
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Check verifies that all participants have contributed to a collective
|
|
|
|
// signature.
|
|
|
|
func (p CompletePolicy) Check(m *Mask) bool {
|
|
|
|
return m.CountEnabled() == m.CountTotal()
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// ThresholdPolicy allows to specify a simple t-of-n policy requring that at
|
|
|
|
// least the given threshold number of participants t have cosigned to make a
|
|
|
|
// collective signature valid.
|
|
|
|
type ThresholdPolicy struct {
|
|
|
|
thold int
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// NewThresholdPolicy returns a new ThresholdPolicy with the given threshold.
|
|
|
|
func NewThresholdPolicy(thold int) *ThresholdPolicy {
|
|
|
|
return &ThresholdPolicy{thold: thold}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Check verifies that at least a threshold number of participants have
|
|
|
|
// contributed to a collective signature.
|
|
|
|
func (p ThresholdPolicy) Check(m *Mask) bool {
|
|
|
|
return m.CountEnabled() >= p.thold
|
|
|
|
}
|