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/* |
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Package cosi implements the collective signing (CoSi) algorithm as presented in |
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the paper "Keeping Authorities 'Honest or Bust' with Decentralized Witness |
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Cosigning" by Ewa Syta et al. See https://arxiv.org/abs/1503.08768. This
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package only provides the functionality for the cryptographic operations of |
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CoSi. All network-related operations have to be handled elsewhere. Below we |
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describe a high-level overview of the CoSi protocol (using a star communication |
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topology). We refer to the research paper for further details on communication |
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over trees, exception mechanisms and signature verification policies. |
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The CoSi protocol has four phases executed between a list of participants P |
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having a protocol leader (index i = 0) and a list of other nodes (index i > 0). |
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The secret key of node i is denoted by a_i and the public key by A_i = [a_i]G |
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(where G is the base point of the underlying group and [...] denotes scalar |
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multiplication). The aggregate public key is given as A = \sum{i ∈ P}(A_i). |
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1. Announcement: The leader broadcasts an announcement to the other nodes |
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optionally including the message M to be signed. Upon receiving an announcement |
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message, a node starts its commitment phase. |
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2. Commitment: Each node i (including the leader) picks a random scalar v_i, |
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computes its commitment V_i = [v_i]G and sends V_i back to the leader. The |
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leader waits until it has received enough commitments (according to some |
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policy) from the other nodes or a timer has run out. Let P' be the nodes that |
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have sent their commitments. The leader computes an aggregate commitment V from |
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all commitments he has received, i.e., V = \sum{j ∈ P'}(V_j) and creates a |
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participation bitmask Z. The leader then broadcasts V and Z to the other |
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participations together with the message M if it was not sent in phase 1. Upon |
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receiving a commitment message, a node starts the challenge phase. |
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3. Challenge: Each node i computes the collective challenge c = H(V || A || M) |
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using a cryptographic hash function H (here: SHA512), computes its |
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response r_i = v_i + c*a_i and sends it back to the leader. |
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4. Response: The leader waits until he has received replies from all nodes in |
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P' or a timer has run out. If he has not enough replies he aborts. Finally, |
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the leader computes the aggregate response r = \sum{j ∈ P'}(r_j) and publishes |
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(V,r,Z) as the signature for the message M. |
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*/ |
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package crypto |
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import ( |
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"errors" |
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"fmt" |
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"github.com/dedis/kyber" |
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) |
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// Commit returns a random scalar v, generated from the given suite,
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// and a corresponding commitment V = [v]G. If the given cipher stream is nil,
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// a random stream is used.
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func Commit(suite Suite) (v kyber.Scalar, V kyber.Point) { |
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random := suite.Scalar().Pick(suite.RandomStream()) |
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commitment := suite.Point().Mul(random, nil) |
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return random, commitment |
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} |
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// AggregateCommitments returns the sum of the given commitments and the
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// bitwise OR of the corresponding masks.
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func AggregateCommitments(suite Suite, commitments []kyber.Point, masks [][]byte) (sum kyber.Point, commits []byte, err error) { |
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if len(commitments) != len(masks) { |
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return nil, nil, errors.New("mismatching lengths of commitment and mask slices") |
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} |
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aggCom := suite.Point().Null() |
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aggMask := make([]byte, len(masks[0])) |
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for i := range commitments { |
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aggCom = suite.Point().Add(aggCom, commitments[i]) |
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aggMask, err = AggregateMasks(aggMask, masks[i]) |
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if err != nil { |
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return nil, nil, err |
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} |
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} |
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return aggCom, aggMask, nil |
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} |
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// Challenge creates the collective challenge from the given aggregate
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// commitment V, aggregate public key A, and message M, i.e., it returns
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// c = H(V || A || M).
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func Challenge(suite Suite, commitment, public kyber.Point, message []byte) (kyber.Scalar, error) { |
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if commitment == nil { |
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return nil, errors.New("no commitment provided") |
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} |
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if message == nil { |
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return nil, errors.New("no message provided") |
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} |
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hash := suite.Hash() |
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if _, err := commitment.MarshalTo(hash); err != nil { |
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return nil, err |
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} |
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if _, err := public.MarshalTo(hash); err != nil { |
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return nil, err |
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} |
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hash.Write(message) |
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return suite.Scalar().SetBytes(hash.Sum(nil)), nil |
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} |
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// Response creates the response from the given random scalar v, (collective)
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// challenge c, and private key a, i.e., it returns r = v + c*a.
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func Response(suite Suite, private, random, challenge kyber.Scalar) (kyber.Scalar, error) { |
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if private == nil { |
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return nil, errors.New("no private key provided") |
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} |
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if random == nil { |
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return nil, errors.New("no random scalar provided") |
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} |
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if challenge == nil { |
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return nil, errors.New("no challenge provided") |
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} |
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ca := suite.Scalar().Mul(private, challenge) |
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return ca.Add(random, ca), nil |
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} |
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// AggregateResponses returns the sum of given responses.
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func AggregateResponses(suite Suite, responses []kyber.Scalar) (kyber.Scalar, error) { |
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if responses == nil { |
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return nil, errors.New("no responses provided") |
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} |
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r := suite.Scalar().Zero() |
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for i := range responses { |
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r = r.Add(r, responses[i]) |
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} |
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return r, nil |
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} |
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// Sign returns the collective signature from the given (aggregate) commitment
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// V, (aggregate) response r, and participation bitmask Z using the EdDSA
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// format, i.e., the signature is V || r || Z.
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func Sign(suite Suite, commitment kyber.Point, response kyber.Scalar, mask *Mask) ([]byte, error) { |
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if commitment == nil { |
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return nil, errors.New("no commitment provided") |
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} |
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if response == nil { |
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return nil, errors.New("no response provided") |
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} |
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if mask == nil { |
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return nil, errors.New("no mask provided") |
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} |
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lenV := suite.PointLen() |
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lenSig := lenV + suite.ScalarLen() |
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VB, err := commitment.MarshalBinary() |
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if err != nil { |
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return nil, errors.New("marshalling of commitment failed") |
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} |
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RB, err := response.MarshalBinary() |
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if err != nil { |
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return nil, errors.New("marshalling of signature failed") |
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} |
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sig := make([]byte, lenSig+mask.Len()) |
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copy(sig[:], VB) |
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copy(sig[lenV:lenSig], RB) |
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copy(sig[lenSig:], mask.mask) |
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return sig, nil |
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} |
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// Verify checks the given cosignature on the provided message using the list
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// of public keys and cosigning policy.
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func Verify(suite Suite, publics []kyber.Point, message, sig []byte, policy Policy) error { |
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if publics == nil { |
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return errors.New("no public keys provided") |
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} |
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if message == nil { |
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return errors.New("no message provided") |
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} |
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if sig == nil { |
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return errors.New("no signature provided") |
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} |
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if policy == nil { |
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policy = CompletePolicy{} |
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} |
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lenCom := suite.PointLen() |
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VBuff := sig[:lenCom] |
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V := suite.Point() |
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if err := V.UnmarshalBinary(VBuff); err != nil { |
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return errors.New("unmarshalling of commitment failed") |
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} |
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// Unpack the aggregate response
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lenRes := lenCom + suite.ScalarLen() |
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rBuff := sig[lenCom:lenRes] |
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r := suite.Scalar().SetBytes(rBuff) |
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// Unpack the participation mask and get the aggregate public key
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mask, err := NewMask(suite, publics, nil) |
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if err != nil { |
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return err |
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} |
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mask.SetMask(sig[lenRes:]) |
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A := mask.AggregatePublic |
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ABuff, err := A.MarshalBinary() |
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if err != nil { |
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return errors.New("marshalling of aggregate public key failed") |
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} |
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// Recompute the challenge
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hash := suite.Hash() |
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hash.Write(VBuff) |
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hash.Write(ABuff) |
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hash.Write(message) |
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buff := hash.Sum(nil) |
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k := suite.Scalar().SetBytes(buff) |
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// k * -aggPublic + s * B = k*-A + s*B
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// from s = k * a + r => s * B = k * a * B + r * B <=> s*B = k*A + r*B
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// <=> s*B + k*-A = r*B
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minusPublic := suite.Point().Neg(A) |
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kA := suite.Point().Mul(k, minusPublic) |
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sB := suite.Point().Mul(r, nil) |
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left := suite.Point().Add(kA, sB) |
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if !left.Equal(V) { |
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return errors.New("recreated response is different from signature") |
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} |
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if !policy.Check(mask) { |
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return errors.New("the policy is not fulfilled") |
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} |
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return nil |
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} |
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// Mask represents a cosigning participation bitmask.
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type Mask struct { |
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mask []byte |
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publics []kyber.Point |
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AggregatePublic kyber.Point |
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} |
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// NewMask returns a new participation bitmask for cosigning where all
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// cosigners are disabled by default. If a public key is given it verifies that
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// it is present in the list of keys and sets the corresponding index in the
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// bitmask to 1 (enabled).
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func NewMask(suite Suite, publics []kyber.Point, myKey kyber.Point) (*Mask, error) { |
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m := &Mask{ |
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publics: publics, |
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} |
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m.mask = make([]byte, m.Len()) |
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m.AggregatePublic = suite.Point().Null() |
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if myKey != nil { |
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found := false |
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for i, key := range publics { |
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if key.Equal(myKey) { |
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m.SetBit(i, true) |
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found = true |
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break |
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} |
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} |
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if !found { |
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return nil, errors.New("key not found") |
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} |
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} |
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return m, nil |
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} |
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// Mask returns a copy of the participation bitmask.
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func (m *Mask) Mask() []byte { |
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clone := make([]byte, len(m.mask)) |
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copy(clone[:], m.mask) |
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return clone |
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} |
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// Len returns the mask length in bytes.
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func (m *Mask) Len() int { |
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return (len(m.publics) + 7) >> 3 |
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} |
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// SetMask sets the participation bitmask according to the given byte slice
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// interpreted in little-endian order, i.e., bits 0-7 of byte 0 correspond to
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// cosigners 0-7, bits 0-7 of byte 1 correspond to cosigners 8-15, etc.
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func (m *Mask) SetMask(mask []byte) error { |
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if m.Len() != len(mask) { |
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return fmt.Errorf("mismatching mask lengths") |
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} |
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for i := range m.publics { |
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byt := i >> 3 |
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msk := byte(1) << uint(i&7) |
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if ((m.mask[byt] & msk) == 0) && ((mask[byt] & msk) != 0) { |
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m.mask[byt] ^= msk // flip bit in mask from 0 to 1
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m.AggregatePublic.Add(m.AggregatePublic, m.publics[i]) |
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} |
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if ((m.mask[byt] & msk) != 0) && ((mask[byt] & msk) == 0) { |
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m.mask[byt] ^= msk // flip bit in mask from 1 to 0
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m.AggregatePublic.Sub(m.AggregatePublic, m.publics[i]) |
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} |
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} |
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return nil |
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} |
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// SetBit enables (enable: true) or disables (enable: false) the bit
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// in the participation mask of the given cosigner.
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func (m *Mask) SetBit(i int, enable bool) error { |
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if i >= len(m.publics) { |
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return errors.New("index out of range") |
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} |
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byt := i >> 3 |
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msk := byte(1) << uint(i&7) |
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if ((m.mask[byt] & msk) == 0) && enable { |
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m.mask[byt] ^= msk // flip bit in mask from 0 to 1
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m.AggregatePublic.Add(m.AggregatePublic, m.publics[i]) |
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} |
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if ((m.mask[byt] & msk) != 0) && !enable { |
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m.mask[byt] ^= msk // flip bit in mask from 1 to 0
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m.AggregatePublic.Sub(m.AggregatePublic, m.publics[i]) |
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} |
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return nil |
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} |
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// IndexEnabled checks whether the given index is enabled in the mask or not.
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func (m *Mask) IndexEnabled(i int) (bool, error) { |
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if i >= len(m.publics) { |
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return false, errors.New("index out of range") |
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} |
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byt := i >> 3 |
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msk := byte(1) << uint(i&7) |
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return ((m.mask[byt] & msk) != 0), nil |
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} |
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// KeyEnabled checks whether the index, corresponding to the given key, is
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// enabled in the mask or not.
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func (m *Mask) KeyEnabled(public kyber.Point) (bool, error) { |
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for i, key := range m.publics { |
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if key.Equal(public) { |
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return m.IndexEnabled(i) |
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} |
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} |
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return false, errors.New("key not found") |
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} |
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// CountEnabled returns the number of enabled nodes in the CoSi participation
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// mask.
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func (m *Mask) CountEnabled() int { |
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// hw is hamming weight
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hw := 0 |
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for i := range m.publics { |
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byt := i >> 3 |
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msk := byte(1) << uint(i&7) |
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if (m.mask[byt] & msk) != 0 { |
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hw++ |
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} |
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} |
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return hw |
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} |
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// CountTotal returns the total number of nodes this CoSi instance knows.
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func (m *Mask) CountTotal() int { |
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return len(m.publics) |
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} |
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// AggregateMasks computes the bitwise OR of the two given participation masks.
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func AggregateMasks(a, b []byte) ([]byte, error) { |
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if len(a) != len(b) { |
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return nil, errors.New("mismatching mask lengths") |
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} |
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m := make([]byte, len(a)) |
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for i := range m { |
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m[i] = a[i] | b[i] |
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} |
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return m, nil |
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} |
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// Policy represents a fully customizable cosigning policy deciding what
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// cosigner sets are and aren't sufficient for a collective signature to be
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// considered acceptable to a verifier. The Check method may inspect the set of
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// participants that cosigned by invoking cosi.Mask and/or cosi.MaskBit, and may
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// use any other relevant contextual information (e.g., how security-critical
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// the operation relying on the collective signature is) in determining whether
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// the collective signature was produced by an acceptable set of cosigners.
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type Policy interface { |
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Check(m *Mask) bool |
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} |
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// CompletePolicy is the default policy requiring that all participants have
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// cosigned to make a collective signature valid.
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type CompletePolicy struct { |
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} |
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// Check verifies that all participants have contributed to a collective
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// signature.
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func (p CompletePolicy) Check(m *Mask) bool { |
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return m.CountEnabled() == m.CountTotal() |
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} |
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// ThresholdPolicy allows to specify a simple t-of-n policy requring that at
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// least the given threshold number of participants t have cosigned to make a
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// collective signature valid.
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type ThresholdPolicy struct { |
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thold int |
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} |
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// NewThresholdPolicy returns a new ThresholdPolicy with the given threshold.
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func NewThresholdPolicy(thold int) *ThresholdPolicy { |
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return &ThresholdPolicy{thold: thold} |
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} |
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// Check verifies that at least a threshold number of participants have
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// contributed to a collective signature.
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func (p ThresholdPolicy) Check(m *Mask) bool { |
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return m.CountEnabled() >= p.thold |
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} |
@ -1,109 +0,0 @@ |
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package crypto |
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import ( |
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"crypto/cipher" |
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) |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// A Scalar kyber.y represents a scalar value by which
|
|
||||||
// a Point (group element) may be encrypted to produce another Point.
|
|
||||||
// This is an exponent in DSA-style groups,
|
|
||||||
// in which security is based on the Discrete Logarithm assumption,
|
|
||||||
// and a scalar multiplier in elliptic curve groups.
|
|
||||||
type Scalar interface { |
|
||||||
// Equality test for two Scalars derived from the same Group
|
|
||||||
Equal(s2 Scalar) bool |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Set sets the receiver equal to another Scalar a
|
|
||||||
Set(a Scalar) Scalar |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Clone creates a new Scalar with same value
|
|
||||||
Clone() Scalar |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Set sets the receiver to a small integer value
|
|
||||||
SetInt64(v int64) Scalar |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Set to the additive identity (0)
|
|
||||||
Zero() Scalar |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Set to the modular sum of scalars a and b
|
|
||||||
Add(a, b Scalar) Scalar |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Set to the modular difference a - b
|
|
||||||
Sub(a, b Scalar) Scalar |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Set to the modular negation of scalar a
|
|
||||||
Neg(a Scalar) Scalar |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Set to the multiplicative identity (1)
|
|
||||||
One() Scalar |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Set to the modular product of scalars a and b
|
|
||||||
Mul(a, b Scalar) Scalar |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Set to the modular division of scalar a by scalar b
|
|
||||||
Div(a, b Scalar) Scalar |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Set to the modular inverse of scalar a
|
|
||||||
Inv(a Scalar) Scalar |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Set to a fresh random or pseudo-random scalar
|
|
||||||
Pick(rand cipher.Stream) Scalar |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// SetBytes sets the scalar from a byte-slice,
|
|
||||||
// reducing if necessary to the appropriate modulus.
|
|
||||||
// The endianess of the byte-slice is determined by the
|
|
||||||
// implementation.
|
|
||||||
SetBytes([]byte) Scalar |
|
||||||
} |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// A Point kyber.y represents an element of a public-key cryptographic Group.
|
|
||||||
// For example,
|
|
||||||
// this is a number modulo the prime P in a DSA-style Schnorr group,
|
|
||||||
// or an (x, y) point on an elliptic curve.
|
|
||||||
// A Point can contain a Diffie-Hellman public key, an ElGamal ciphertext, etc.
|
|
||||||
type Point interface { |
|
||||||
// Equality test for two Points derived from the same Group
|
|
||||||
Equal(s2 Point) bool |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Null sets the receiver to the neutral identity element.
|
|
||||||
Null() Point |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Set sets the receiver to this group's standard base point.
|
|
||||||
Base() Point |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Pick sets the receiver to a fresh random or pseudo-random Point.
|
|
||||||
Pick(rand cipher.Stream) Point |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Set sets the receiver equal to another Point p.
|
|
||||||
Set(p Point) Point |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Clone clones the underlying point.
|
|
||||||
Clone() Point |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Maximum number of bytes that can be embedded in a single
|
|
||||||
// group element via Pick().
|
|
||||||
EmbedLen() int |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Embed encodes a limited amount of specified data in the
|
|
||||||
// Point, using r as a source of cryptographically secure
|
|
||||||
// random data. Implementations only embed the first EmbedLen
|
|
||||||
// bytes of the given data.
|
|
||||||
Embed(data []byte, r cipher.Stream) Point |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Extract data embedded in a point chosen via Embed().
|
|
||||||
// Returns an error if doesn't represent valid embedded data.
|
|
||||||
Data() ([]byte, error) |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Add points so that their scalars add homomorphically
|
|
||||||
Add(a, b Point) Point |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Subtract points so that their scalars subtract homomorphically
|
|
||||||
Sub(a, b Point) Point |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Set to the negation of point a
|
|
||||||
Neg(a Point) Point |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
// Multiply point p by the scalar s.
|
|
||||||
// If p == nil, multiply with the standard base point Base().
|
|
||||||
Mul(s Scalar, p Point) Point |
|
||||||
} |
|
@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ |
|||||||
|
package crypto |
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
import "github.com/dedis/kyber" |
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
// Suite specifies the cryptographic building blocks required for the cosi package.
|
||||||
|
type Suite interface { |
||||||
|
kyber.Group |
||||||
|
kyber.HashFactory |
||||||
|
kyber.Random |
||||||
|
} |
Loading…
Reference in new issue